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ABSTRACT 
 
Ownership Structure, Board Characteristics, and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
by 
 
ZHOU Ying 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
Tax aggressiveness, as commonly proxied by the effective tax rate (ETR), measures a 
firm’s effort spent on minimizing its tax payments. It is suggested that more tax 
aggressive firms have greater incentives to allocate resources to minimize taxes and 
thus have lower ETRs. Corporate governance has been continuously receiving 
attention in literature across different fields and can affect a firm’s tax strategy 
through its control mechanism. This thesis investigates how corporate governance 
influences a firm’s tax aggressiveness. The main hypothesis of this thesis is whether 
firms with good corporate governance will have less incentives and opportunities to 
manage tax aggressively. Specifically, I take advantages of the distinct institutional 
settings in China to study whether the Chinese firm’s tax aggressiveness is affected 
by ownership structure and the characteristics of board of directors. Using all 
non-financial listed companies in the Chinese A-share market during 2003 and 2009 
period, I find that firms with state-controlled nature and lower proportion of 
controlling shares pursue less aggressive tax strategies and maintain higher ETRs. In 
addition, my finding is consistent with prior literature that a higher percentage of the 
boards’ shareholdings and dual service duties performed by the board chairman result 
in lower ETRs. However, I do not find a significant relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors and tax aggressiveness which may suggest the 
ineffective role of independent directors in China. 
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Ownership Structure, Board Characteristics, and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis studies how corporate governance affects a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness.
1
 In particular, I focus on two aspects of corporate governance: 
ownership structure and board of directors’ characteristics. The main hypothesis is 
that good corporate governance firms will have less incentives and opportunities to 
manage tax aggressively. 
Corporate governance has been continuously receiving special attention in 
literature across different fields. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) examine 
the role of investor protections and ownership concentration in financial market 
development. Leuz et al. (2003) measure earnings management in different investor 
protection regimes across 31 countries with different corporate governance. Kim and 
Yi (2006) use Korean data to show that larger control-ownership disparity leads to 
more earnings management. Some studies document the relationship between 
ownership concentration and stock price performance (Gul et al., 2010; Ferreira and 
Laux, 2007). Larcker et al. (2007) adopt seven general proxies for governance in 
                                                     
1
 I define tax aggressiveness as a firm’s effort spent on minimizing its tax payments legally. It is 
different from tax evasion which is considered as illegal and unethical by the tax authority. In this 
thesis, tax aggressiveness, tax avoidance, tax sheltering, tax management, and tax planning are used 
interchangeably. More details about the definition will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 2 
 
measuring their relationship with firm performance.  
The basic intuition for how corporate governance interacts with tax 
aggressiveness can be explained by the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. For managers, the complexity and opaque of tax avoidance activities 
can become a shield for managerial opportunism (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008). 
Moreover, their performance-linked compensation packages provide incentives to 
report higher profits which can be achieved by engaging in tax aggressiveness. For 
shareholders, it might be generally expected that they prefer tax aggressiveness 
(Chen et al., 2010). However, the benefits received from aggressive tax strategy can 
be offset by the hidden agency costs arising from management who mask their rent 
extraction activities.
2
 Thus, shareholders’ attitude towards tax aggressiveness 
depends on their evaluation of both costs and benefits. Moreover, different levels of 
tax aggressiveness are desired by the majority shareholders compared with the 
minority shareholders. The board of directors, who serves as the mitigating party to 
reduce agency costs can either play a monitoring role to prevent the management 
entrenchment or an advisory role in helping managers to achieve better firm 
performance. 
A stream of literature examines whether corporate governance as a mediator can 
                                                     
2
 Rent extraction is a portion of agency cost which the managements can extract rents from the firm 
that are beyond the optimal level of what shareholders are willing to pay. Examples of rent extraction 
activities include earnings management and related party transactions. 
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influence the shareholders’ perception on company tax avoidance. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) argue that the increases in high-powered incentives tend to 
reduce the level of tax sheltering to a greater extent in better-governed firms than in 
worse-governed firms. In Desai and Dharmapala (2009) study, they further point out 
that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm corporate 
governance. Based on a sample of 59 indentified tax shelter participants, Wilson 
(2009) finds evidence that firms with strong corporate governance exhibit positive 
abnormal returns. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find a similar result that market reacts 
less negatively to news of tax aggressiveness in better-governed firms. One of the 
limitations in their studies is only tax shelter participants are examined which creates 
difficulties in generalizing to a broader set of companies. Moreover, these studies do 
not analyze the direct impact of corporate governance on tax avoidance, nor do they 
look into the influence of some specific governance factors such as ownership 
structure rather than employing the general index measures of governance developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003).  
An emerging literature starts to focus on the direct effect of corporate 
governance on company’s tax aggressiveness. Chen et al. (2010) raise four measures 
(two effective tax rate measures and two book-tax difference measures) of tax 
aggressiveness and find a negative association between family ownership and tax 
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aggressiveness. The result is consistent with family owners are more willing to forgo 
tax benefits to avoid the potential penalty and reputation damage. Minnick and Noga 
(2010) specifically study the link between board characteristics and long-run tax 
management. They find that companies with more independent board, less 
entrenched management, and increased director pay-performance-sensitivity are 
more likely to manage tax. However, these two studies have not examined the 
influence of controlling shareholders on the tax aggressiveness, nor do they link the 
ownership structure to board characteristics. I attempt to fill this gap in the literature 
by using Chinese listed companies as my sample to investigate the ownership 
structure and board characteristics’ direct impact on firm’s tax aggressiveness. 
I take advantages of the distinct institutional settings in China to develop two 
main hypotheses. First, public firms in China maintain a high ownership 
concentration as in other East Asian countries (Gul et al., 2010). Moreover, for most 
Chinese listed companies, the ultimate controlling shareholder is the Chinese 
government which directly or indirectly influences companies through its 
shareholding (cash-flow right) or political power (control right). As such, in 
determining a firm’s tax strategy, managers have to face the power from controlling 
shareholders, especially when they are also the government entities. Second, the 
board of directors is a relatively new internal control mechanism for most Chinese 
 5 
 
listed firms. Prior studies provide mixed and inconclusive results on the impact of 
board composition, board independence, and board shareholdings on firm 
performance and few have addressed how these board characteristics affect a 
company’s tax strategy. Therefore, whether the board effectiveness can be a valuable 
signal for tax aggressiveness is yet to be confirmed. 
Using all Chinese listed non-financial A-share companies data from 2003-2009, 
I examine how ownership structure and board characteristics affect tax 
aggressiveness. Specifically, the percentage of controlling shareholdings and the 
nature of the controlling shareholders are selected to test the impact of ownership 
concentration and government intervention on effective tax rates (ETRs). I limit the 
board characteristics in three main areas: board composition, duality services 
performed by the board chairman, and board shareholdings.
3
 The results show that 
corporate governance plays an important role in tax management. Companies with 
higher proportion of controlling shares are more likely to adopt aggressive tax 
strategy as the benefits derived from the entrenchment effect of ownership 
concentration provide greater incentives for firms to avoid taxes. Moreover, 
compared with state-controlled firms, non-state-controlled firms are more tax 
aggressive. The finding suggests that the government plays an influential role in 
                                                     
3
 Duality services performed by the board chairman means the board chairman is also the CEO of a 
firm. It is a normal practice for medium or small size firms when they are lack of resources and 
expertise. Although the board independence issue may arise, the Company Law in China does not 
restrict such duality role. 
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affecting a company’s tax strategy. For board characteristics, my results are 
consistent with prior literature that higher percentage of the boards’ shareholdings 
and dual-service duties performed by the chairman lead to lower ETRs. However, I 
do not find a significant relationship between the percentage of independent directors 
and tax aggressiveness which may suggest the ineffective role of independent 
directors in China. 
There are three rationales for conducting my research. First, ownership structure 
and board characteristics are considered as two important areas in corporate 
governance literature. This thesis tries to use different proxies to capture their 
influences on tax aggressiveness in depth rather than using one general corporate 
governance score. Second, the Chinese listed companies which are characterized by 
concentrated ownership and government intervention are under studied in the 
taxation area. My research can fill this gap. Third, the results of this research are not 
only a valuable reference for company executives to set up their corporate 
governance, but also for tax authority to revise the related tax law and tax 
enforcement. 
    This thesis contributes to the extant literature in several ways. I extend the 
extant studies to examine the direct impact of corporate governance on tax 
aggressiveness. Two specific aspects—ownership structure and board characteristics 
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are studied rather than employing one general index to proxy for corporate 
governance. Besides, the unique ownership structure in China provides me an 
opportunity to explore the under-studied field that links tax avoidance activities to 
ownership concentration, especially when the government is the controlling 
shareholder. In addition to the classic issues of ownership structure in the Chinese 
context, I consider the governance mechanism played by the board of directors which 
is new and fresh to the Chinese listed firms. Prior literature studied broadly the board 
size and independence, however, less attention is given to the duality services of 
board chairman and board shareholdings. My study can fill this gap by providing a 
more in depth examination of board effectiveness. 
    The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the institutional 
background in China. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the data, research methodology, and model. Chapter 
5 presents the results and sensitivity tests, and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
2.1 Enterprise Income Tax in China 
    In China, state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, private enterprises, 
joint operation enterprises, joint equity enterprises, and other organizations are legal 
taxpayers of enterprise income tax. The tax base is the world-wide income from 
business and productions. Companies are taxed in two levels: central government 
which is governed by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and local 
government which is levied on provincial basis.  
    Prior to 2008, the statutory enterprise income tax rates for domestics companies 
and foreign (invested) companies were different. According to the Provisional 
Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax in People’s Republic of China, the statutory 
rate is 33% for domestic companies, while the Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
stipulated a reduced tax rate of 15% for those foreign companies doing businesses in 
special economic zones or 24% for those settled in open costal economic zones. On 
16 March 2007, the two laws were combined into one new enterprise income tax law, 
effective from 1 January 2008. The new unified tax rate is 25% for both domestic 
and foreign invested enterprises. 
 9 
 
    In this thesis, I use year dummies from 2003 to 2009 to control for not only the 
tax reform but also the changes of accounting rules that may create difficulty in 
interpreting the difference in ETRs. In the sensitivity tests, tax reform will be 
examined in depth separately.  
 
2.2 Ownership structure in China 
China was dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before the ownership 
structure reform in 2005. In SOEs, the government was the only controlling 
shareholder by holding the non-tradable state-owned shares or legal person shares. 
This highly concentrated ownership leads to the inefficient and static operation in 
SOEs as they were set up to pursue government’s political policies rather than 
maximize shareholders’ interests. The ownership structure reform was to convert 
part of the non-tradable shares to tradable shares which can be bought and sold in 
the capital market so that different types of shareholders such as institutional 
shareholders, employee shareholders, and individual shareholders can have more 
power to monitor the SOEs. Moreover, the reform encourages the SOEs to respond 
to the market rather than achieve the economic targets set by the government. 
Although the initial intention of the reform is to allow institutional and 
individual shareholders to participate in the stock market, the government still 
 10 
 
maintains invisible controls in companies with high government ownership. In other 
words, the transformation cannot totally dilute or eliminate the profound influence 
of the government on firms’ operation. Even though the government does not 
directly intervene in a firm’s operation, it can still indirectly impose influences 
through the government entities by setting up the complex shareholding pyramid. 
Another ownership issue is the ownership concentration in Chinese listed firms. 
Compared with the diffuse ownership structure in the U.S., many listed companies 
in China still have one major owner holding a significant percentage of shares (Bai 
et al., 2004). Thus, the special ownership structure characteristics in China such as 
the controlling shareholdings and the government controlling shareholder are worthy 
to be examined. 
In this thesis, controlling shareholder is defined as the one that satisfies one of 
the following criteria according to the Article 41 of the Guidelines for the Articles of 
Association of Listed Companies:  
1) The one who can elect more than half of the directors; 
2) The one who can execute over 30% of controlling rights; 
3) The one who holds more than 30% of shares; or 
4) The one who can control the company in practice by other forms. 
Prior literature usually uses 20% rather than 30% shareholdings as the cut off point 
for controlling shareholder, I will also perform a sensitivity analysis by using this 
alternative definition for controlling shareholder. 
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2.3 Board of Directors in China 
Compared with some Western countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., 
corporate governance in China is still at the infant stage. The milestone was the 
issuance of Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (the 
―Code‖) by China Securities Regulatory Commission on 7 January 2001. The Code 
sets up the basic principles of investors’ interests protection and the code of conduct 
for managers, directors as well as supervisors. There are currently three laws and 
regulations that govern the board of directors: the Company Law, the Establishment 
of Independent Directors Systems by Publicly Listed Companies Guiding opinion 
(the ―Guiding Opinion‖), and the Code. The Company Law is the only mandatory 
law for firms to follow while the other two are voluntarily adopted guiding opinions. 
The major duties of the board are to ratify management decisions and monitor 
management performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The main duty of the board 
chairman is to organize regular board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, 
firing, compensating and evaluating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). There are some special 
characteristics of the board of directors in China. First, the independent directors are 
more decorative than functional (Su, 2010). Many independent directors serve more 
than one board across different companies (interlocking directorate) and their main 
tasks are to attend board meetings and social. The interlocking directorate although 
 12 
 
creates information and resources sharing through these ties, it imposes uncertainties 
on shareholders about the board independence and effectiveness. Second, the duality 
role of the board chairman is not prohibited. In this case, both the board and the 
company are led by the same person that may increase the collusion between 
management and the board while weaken the proper supervision function of the 
board. Third, the board of directors in Chinese joint-stock firms consists mainly of 
representatives or officials from the government and other state entities, whose 
interests are not the same as those of outside investors (Su, 2005). Even though the 
government bureaucrats do not serve the board, the state can formally exercise its 
rights as a controlling shareholder by appointing directors to the board (Tenev and 
Zhang, 2002). In this case, the government associated controlling shareholders can 
pursue their own interests. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
3.1 Tax aggressiveness 
There are no universally accepted definitions or measurements of tax 
aggressiveness (Hanlon and Heizman, 2010). In this thesis, I define tax 
aggressiveness as a firm’s effort spent on minimizing its tax payments legally. It has 
the similar meaning with tax planning, tax management, and tax avoidance provided 
that they are acceptable within the legal and ethical dimensions by the tax authority. 
However, as tax planning is often based on expert judgment without clearly written 
guidelines, the extreme level of tax aggressiveness is tax avoidance. Tax avoidance 
is strictly prohibited by tax authority and it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
It is suggested that tax aggressive firms have greater incentives to allocate 
resources to lessen tax expenses and thus result in lower ETRs and a wider gap 
between book and taxable incomes. For example, a firm can set up an offshore 
subsidiary in tax haven such as British Virgin Islands (BVI) or Bermuda and 
transfers some profits to those subsidiaries in order to reduce total worldwide tax 
expenditures. Factors that influence tax aggressiveness include firm-specific 
characteristics and corporate governance. Firm-specific characteristics, such as firm 
size, profitability, growth, and leverage ratio are all inherent to a corporation which 
 14 
 
cannot be changed in a short time period. My main focus in this thesis is how 
corporate governance can affect a firm’s tax strategy when firm characteristics are 
controlled for. Specifically, I focus on examining the direct impact of two important 
components of corporate governance—ownership structure and board characteristics 
on a firm’s tax aggressiveness. 
Tax aggressiveness can associate with both benefits and costs. The most 
significant benefit is the increase in after-tax firm value which is a positive signal to 
investors. In addition, the complexity and opaque of tax aggressive activities provide 
good opportunities for managers to mask their rent extraction activities (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). Moreover, managers may not need to tradeoff between lower 
taxable income and higher accounting income because tax minimization can be 
achieved without affecting accounting profits (Phillips et al., 2003; Frank et al., 
2009). It is reasonable to expect that the managers can benefit more than 
shareholders so that they have incentives to engage in tax aggressive activities. One 
potential risk for company to adopt aggressive tax strategy is that it may 
unintentionally to be ―too aggressive‖ that fits into the area of tax evasion as the 
final judgment lies in the tax authority. If this is the case, the associated costs can be 
the potential penalty imposed by SAT which results in a firm’s reputation being 
damaged and share price being discounted by investors (Chen et al., 2010). In 
 15 
 
addition, the resources invested in tax management such as hiring tax experts, 
engaging in complex transfer pricing activities, allocating time and effort can be 
opportunity costs for forgoing other profitable investments. 
 
3.2 Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is a major issue to study in corporate governance (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Corporate governance literature has documented that corporate 
ownership is concentrated on the hands of controlling shareholders around the world 
(Claessens et al., 2002). La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the prevalence of 
ownership concentration can be attributed to weak investor protection. Concentrated 
ownership is a way to solve the agency problem between managers and shareholders, 
however, it creates another type of conflict of interests: the controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008). From the management 
entrenchment perspective, ownership concentration provides incentives and 
opportunities for controlling shareholders to extract firm resources at the expense of 
outside minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002). The entrenched controlling 
shareholders can utilize their effective control over the firm by engaging in 
self-dealing transactions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In general, firms with 
concentrated ownership have greater incentives to avoid taxes (Desai and 
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Dharmapala, 2008). 
Adhikari et al. (2006) argue that the impact of ownership structure on ETRs has 
not been explored sufficiently, especially in developing countries. For Asian 
countries like China, listed companies usually have one major owner holding a 
significant percent of shares (Bai et al., 2004). Gul et al. (2010) suggest that 
ownership concentration is one of the main characteristics observed in Chinese 
listed firms and corporate ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of a single 
investor associated with the government, exercising nearly full control over 
corporate decisions and directly engage in managerial process. Thus, I predict that 
firms with higher percentage of controlling shareholdings pursue more aggressive 
tax strategies.  
Chan et al. (2010) claim that in China, government entities are the controlling 
shareholders of many listed companies. Cheung et al. (2010) argue that the 
government who remains the major shareholder of SOEs can hinder the realization 
of good corporate governance by Chinese listed firms. Su (2010) finds that 
government-controlled firms intend to use less debt financing and lessen the 
unrelated diversification. The concentrated ownership via direct state-owned shares 
will increase the level of firm inefficiency (Hu et al., 2010).  
Prior studies suggest two views regarding government intervention through 
 17 
 
controlling shareholdings: social and political view. From the social view, 
government-controlled firms can maximize social welfare (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980). The government sometimes uses state ownership to achieve its social goals 
such as maximizing tax revenues (Wu et al., 2009). The political view suggests that 
individual politicians try to influence state-controlled firms to pursue their political 
objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). A government controlling shareholder can 
use the listed company as a vehicle to achieve political goals even though they may 
conflict with shareholders’ interests (Bai et al., 2000). Consistent with these views, 
state-controlled firms are less tax aggressive because they help the government to 
achieve its social and political objectives such as public infrastructure construction. 
Khurana and Moser (2009) find that firms with higher levels of long-term 
institutional ownership are less tax aggressive because institutional owners are more 
concerned with long-term consequences of aggressive tax strategy. In contrast, 
higher levels of short-term institutional ownership lead to more tax aggressive as 
they focus on more short-term profits making. Chen et al. (2010) find that family 
firms are less tax aggressive. They argue that family owners with high shareholdings 
can enjoy more benefits from tax savings. However, the potential costs such as 
reputation damage and penalty imposed by IRS are also higher for them. Compared 
with non-family owners, family owners are more concerned about the associated 
 18 
 
cost of tax aggressiveness, therefore they are less tax aggressive. The result is 
consistent with Khurana and Moser (2009)’s findings as family owners are more 
likely to focus on long-term investment horizon. In summary, the short-term benefits 
received from tax aggressiveness can be diluted by associated costs in the long-run. 
Family owners and long-term institutional shareholders are more concerned on 
sustainability development of the firm who may object to tax aggressiveness. Thus, 
when the ownership is concentrated on the shareholder who can execute major 
influences on the firm’s strategies, such as the family owners or institutional 
shareholders, it may lead to less aggressive tax strategy. 
Overall, both the concentrated ownership and government intervention are 
commonly observed in Chinese listed companies. The controlling shareholders have 
influential impact on a firm’s operation and strategy implementation. Tax 
aggressiveness, as an effective means to increase after-tax firm value and cover up 
management rent extraction activities, may induce controlling shareholders to 
entrench from minority shareholders while enjoying tax-saving benefits. Thus, a 
higher percentage of controlling shareholdings may lead to more aggressive tax 
strategy. The unique ownership structure in China results in the presence of the 
government as the controlling shareholder of most listed firms. In this case, the 
power of the controlling shareholder is strengthened and a more social or political 
 19 
 
firm strategies are implemented. Therefore, less tax aggressive could be observed in 
state-controlled firms. Based on the above reasons, I hypothesize: 
H1(a):The percentage of controlling shareholdings is positively correlated with a 
firm’s tax aggressiveness, ceteris paribus. 
H1(b):State-controlled firms are less tax aggressive than non-state-controlled firms, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
3.3 Board of directors 
The separation of ownership and control creates agency costs between the 
principals (shareholders) and agents (management). The board of directors, which 
maintains the power to hire, fire, and compensate management, can serve to align 
interests of the two parties and reduce the agency costs (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). 
Other than the monitoring role, the board of directors also serves the advisory role. It 
is in the director’s best interest to increase the value of the firm, with which one 
method is through effective management of the firm’s tax expenditure (Yermack, 
2004). Thus, the board plays an important role in corporate governance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
Most of the prior studies link board of directors to firm performance, only one 
published paper comes to my knowledge that examines the direct effect of the board 
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on tax management. Minnick and Noga (2010) study the board composition, 
managerial entrenchment, and director compensation and find that companies with 
more independent board, less managerial entrenchment, and increased 
performance-based compensation for directors are more likely to manage tax. To 
extend the existing literature, in this thesis, I focus on the impact of board 
composition, duality role of the board chairman, and board shareholdings on tax 
aggressiveness. 
 
3.3.1 Board Composition 
The composition of the board of directors determines its effectiveness (Jensen, 
1993; Dechow et al., 1996). The mixture of insiders and outsiders should be an 
optimal constitution of board (Fama and Jensen, 1983)
4
. On the one hand, the board 
with more insiders may potentially face ―independence‖ problem because their 
monitoring role is diminished by engaging in self-reviewing activities. On the other 
hand, the dominant number of outsiders can create a wider gap between the 
management and shareholders as they have less insight into firm operation. 
Prior literature provides mixed results of board independence on firm 
performance. Some studies find that the independent directors can have positive 
                                                     
4
 Insider refers to the one who obtains knowledge of a firm’s daily operation, such as a firm’s 
executive, employee, and retired employee. Outsider constitutes independent director such as the 
university professor, financer, and consultant. 
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impact on firm performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) point out that the board 
comprises largely of outsiders are more effective and the addition of an outside 
director can increase firm value. Weisbach (1988) reports that CEO turnover is 
highly correlated with firm performance in companies having outside directors 
dominant board. Borokhovich et al. (1996) also confirm that the board with more 
outside directors is more likely to replace poor CEOs with executives from other 
firms. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that bidding firms with at least half of 
independent outside directors have higher announcement-date abnormal returns. The 
boards with more independent directors may help to improve firm performance and 
increase firm value (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). On the other hand, some find 
negative or even no relationship between board independence and firm performance. 
The independent directors may help to allocate resources to a firm’s tax management 
strategy by providing their unique experience and useful knowledge so that more tax 
aggressive will be observed (Minnick and Noga, 2010). The CEOs have dominant 
role in selecting outside directors which may impose doubts about their independent 
performance (Mace, 1986). Dahya and McConnell (2005) find no evidence that 
boards dominated by outside directors have better performance than those dominated 
by inside directors.  
In emerging economies like China, Singh and Gaur (2009) argue that the board 
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of directors plays an advisory role rather than the oversight role. Peng (2004) finds 
that the outside directors have positive effect on firm performance as they are more 
concerned with firm operation to maximize shareholders’ investment and bring 
useful resources as well as social ties. Kato and Long (2006) also claim that the 
independent directors who are truly independent of the controlling shareholders have 
potential to improve the quality of corporate governance. I predict that the firms with 
more independent directors are less tax aggressive with the following reasons. First, 
directors who are appointed by shareholders shall protect shareholders’ interests 
from being extracted by management. If shareholders decide not to adopt tax 
aggressiveness after considering the related costs and benefits, more independent 
directors may help to objectively evaluate and disapprove such aggressive tax 
strategies. Second, the interlocking directorate held by independent directors creates 
a greater incentive to monitor corporate decision on behalf of all shareholders (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). As a result, less tax aggressive strategy will be adopted because 
those independent directors are more concerned with establishing their own 
reputation to certify their abilities in providing services on different boards. Yermack 
(2004) studies that the board of directors has two incentives to protect shareholders’ 
interests: the reputation and compensation. Interlocking directorate strengthens the 
directors’ monitoring role to maintain good reputation and may be rewarded with 
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board seats in other companies. Therefore, less firm tax aggressive will be observed. 
Third, compared with inside directors, outside directors are more long-term oriented 
because they typically are officers of other firms or are not currently engaged in 
business (Baysinger and Bulter, 1985). The tax avoidance activity is a short-term 
opportunism investment which may incur long-term costs such as reputation damage. 
Thus, to perform the advisory role, the independent directors are more oppose to tax 
aggressiveness. Based on the above, I hypothesis that:  
H2a: The percentage of independent directors of the board is negatively correlated 
with a company’s tax aggressiveness, ceteris paribus.  
 
3.3.2 CEO as Chairman of the Board 
The duty of the board chairman is to organize board meetings and oversee the 
process of hiring, firing, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). CEO, as the 
executive leader of a firm, is the final decision maker in terms of entity operation. It 
is common that the chairman and CEO is the same person in the U.S.; while in most 
of the European countries such as the U.K. and Canada, these two roles are always 
separated (Lin and Liu, 2009). The different practice across countries reveals that 
the net effect of the chairman duality role has two sides which are consistent with 
the stewardship theory and agency theory (Braun and Sharma, 2007). From the 
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stewardship perspective, the managers are regarded as the steward who can protect 
and maximize shareholders’ interests through firm performance (Davis et al., 1997). 
Thus, the duality service performed by the CEOs can help to execute their autonomy 
in decision making which leads to the positive impact on firm performance. The 
combined leadership structure creates speed decision-making and effective 
leadership which firm strategy formulation and implementation by the CEO are in 
line with the board expectation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Alexander et al., 1993). 
Moreover, the duality role of chairman can avoid potential rivalry between the CEO 
and chairperson and diminish the confusion as a result of the existence of two 
spokespersons (Baliga et al., 1996). On the other hand, the agency theory suggests 
that a more effective control over managers to align their interests to the 
shareholders will be achieved by the separation of the CEO and the chairman. The 
duality role of board chairman may hinder the board’s ability to properly perform 
oversight and governance role while impairing effective monitoring (McWilliams 
and Sen, 1997; Dalton and Kesner, 1997). The co-services performed by the board 
chairman may also insecure directors honestly evaluating firm performance which in 
turn leads to long-term organization drift (Carver, 1990). Having the CEO also 
served as chairman of the board can have negative effect on firm performance (Klein, 
2002). Thus, the effective board consists of separation of the CEO and chairman 
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position (Jensen, 1993). In addition, the chairman of the board should be a 
non-executive director to ensure the overall independence of the board (Beasley et 
al., 2000; Tina and Lau, 2001). Others, such as Brickley et al. (1997) find that the 
combined leadership structure has no strong influence on firm performance or 
managerial behavior. 
The non-conforming between financial and tax reporting rules provides the 
opportunity for managers to engage in tax reporting aggressiveness without affecting 
their book earnings (Phillips et al., 2003). In other words, a firm can simultaneously 
report higher book income and lower taxable income without facing the trade-offs 
between financial and tax reporting decisions (Frank et al., 2009). In this win-win 
situation, CEOs are more willing to participate in firm tax aggressiveness as they 
can benefit from performance-linked compensation and tax savings. I predict that 
the duality role of the board chairman can increase the level of firm tax 
aggressiveness for three reasons. First, the combined leadership structure 
strengthens the relationship between the board and executive teams which the 
aggressive tax strategy can be easily approved and implemented without incurring 
time lags. Second, as the oversight and governance role of the board are potentially 
reduced by the duality service, the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders is further aggravated that results in more tax aggressiveness. Third, the 
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leadership is concentrated in one decision maker and the board members are 
unlikely or unable to challenge his tax strategy proposals without sufficient tax 
knowledge. Based on the above reasons, I hypothesis that: 
H2b: The company with the same person serves as CEO and the board chairman is 
more likely to adopt aggressive tax strategy, ceteris paribus.  
 
3.3.3 Board Shareholdings 
    Encouraging outside directors to hold equity interests can provide better 
incentives (Jensen, 1993). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that equity 
ownership by non-executive board members creates incentive for directors to protect 
financial stake in the firm. Johnson et al. (1993) find that the more equity holdings 
of outside board members, the more their involvement in strategic restructuring. 
Different board ownership level may result in different corporate performance. 
Morck et al. (1988) suggest a positive relation between board shareholdings and 
firm performance when board ownership increases from 0% to 5%. Kren and Kerr 
(1997) find that the board of directors with significant shareholdings has stronger 
linkage between firm performance and compensation. 
With board shareholdings, the interests of board of directors are aligned with 
the firm performance. With good corporate performance, the board can not only 
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receive increased performance-linked compensation but also return from 
shareholding. Tax aggressiveness, which serves as a way to increase after-tax firm 
value, can help the board of directors to enjoy these two benefits. Moreover, 
McWilliams and Sen (1997) study that when inside and outside directors increase 
their ownership of the company, the monitoring role of the board becomes 
ineffective and the potential managerial entrenchment incentives increase. Therefore, 
more aggressive tax strategy will be approved by directors and implemented by the 
company. Based on the above reasoning, my hypothesis is that:  
H2c: The percentage of board shareholdings is positively correlated with a 
company’s tax aggressiveness, ceteris paribus. 
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Chapter 4 Research Method 
 
4.1 Data collection 
My sample consists of all A-share non-financial companies listed in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange covering the period 2003-2009. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g. Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Frank et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2010), 
―Finance and Insurance‖ firms are eliminated because of their special accounting 
treatments. The sample period was chosen because the Corporate Governance Code 
was effective from 2002 and the related controlling shareholder data are only 
available from 2003. All the accounting data used in this thesis are extracted from 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  
    Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary of sample selection. The original sample 
from CSMAR is 10,122 firm-year observations. 623 observations with insufficient 
data to calculate ETRs are deleted. Furthermore, I restricted ETRs to [0,1] which is 
consistent with prior study, e.g. Zimmerman (1983). 1,454 observations with 
missing data were also deleted. Thus, the final sample consists of 6,842 firm-year 
observations (1,552 firms). 
    Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of sample firms by year. The number 
of firms is evenly distributed over the seven-year sample period. Panel C presents 
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the distribution of sample firms across industries based on the Guidance on the 
Industry Category of Listed Companies issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) industry categorization. Over half of the firms are from 
manufacturing, 102 firms (6%) are from information technology sector, and less 
than 1% is from culture and media. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection and Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Firm-year observations of all listed A-share non-financial 
companies between 2003-2009 
10,122 
Less observations with insufficient data to calculate ETR 623 
Less observations with ETR<0 or ETR>1 1,203 
Less observations with missing data 1,454 
Total observations for regression 6,842 
 
Panel B: Yearly Distribution 
Years No. of Firm-Years (%) 
2003 879(12.85) 
972(14.21) 
901(13.17) 
984(14.38) 
1,080(15.78) 
1,020(14.91) 
1,006(14.70) 
6,842(100) 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Total 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution 
Industry Type No. of Firms (%) 
Agriculture 68(4.38) 
Mining 28(1.80) 
Manufacturing 893(57.54) 
Electricity, gas, and water 58(3.74) 
Building and construction 32(2.06) 
Transportation and logistics 57(3.67) 
Information technology 102(6.57) 
Commerce 96(6.19) 
Real estate 100(6.44) 
Service 44(2.84) 
Culture and media 11(0.71) 
Conglomerate  63(4.06) 
Total 1,552(100) 
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4.2 Measures of tax aggressiveness  
        Effective tax rate (ETR) is commonly used to measure corporate tax 
aggressiveness in prior literature (e.g. Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Wilson, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Chen et al., 2010). 
Besides ETRs, emerging alternative measurements of tax aggressiveness exist in 
recent studies, such as long-run cash ETR (Dyreng et al., 2008), abnormal total 
book-tax differences (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006), and permanent book-tax 
differences (Frank et al., 2009). 
In this thesis, I follow Chen et al. (2010) to measure ETR as the ratio of total 
tax expense to pretax income for a given firm i in year t: 
ETRit= Total Tax Expenseit / Pretax Incomeit 
An alternative ETR measurement (computed as dividing total tax expense by 
earnings before interests and taxes) which is used by Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
will be applied in the robustness checks. One of the benefits for using ETR is the 
required data for computation can be easily extracted from publicly available 
financial statements. 
Dyreng et al. (2008) further decomposed the ETR into two parts: Current ETR 
(Total income tax expense – deferred tax expense)/Pretax Income) and Deferred 
ETR (Deferred income tax expense/Pretax income) which can more precisely 
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examine the effect of deferred tax. Another frequently used measurement is the Cash 
ETR (Cash taxes paid/ Pre-tax income). I do not apply these alternative ETRs in this 
thesis for two reasons. First, the deferred tax assets/ liabilities are not required items 
to be included in financial statements by law until the newly release of revised 
China’s accounting standard in 2006, thus, if the decomposition of ETR applies, the 
deferred tax expense can only be calculated from 2006 which not all of my sample 
periods are covered. Second, the cash flow statements of Chinese firms do not 
present enterprise income tax payments separately, rather, all types of cash taxes 
paid are included in one item named ―various taxes paid‖ which I cannot extract the 
exact amount of income taxes paid by cash. 
 
4.3 Research design 
    To test the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on tax 
aggressiveness, I estimate the following regression: 
ETRit = CSit + CS_natureit + Indep_directorit + Co_servicesit + 
BOD_sharesit + LEVit + SIZEit + MBit + ROAit + CAPINTit + 
INVINTit +       
    
                
  
   it 
In this regression, the dependent variable ETR equals to total income tax expenses 
divided by pretax income. Both the explanatory variables CS and CS_nature are 
included to test the effect of ownership structure on tax aggressiveness. CS is the 
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percentage of a company’s shares held by the controlling shareholders. For H1(a), I 
expect to be negative which means that higher ownership concentration could 
lead to a lower effective tax rate, i.e. more tax aggressive. CS_nature is a dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is the government, 0 
otherwise. As hypothesized in H1(b), a firm has less incentives to engage in 
aggressive tax strategy when its ultimate controlling shareholder is the Chinese 
government. Therefore, I expect to be positive. In the sensitivity test, two groups 
of alternative measurements to proxy for ownership structure will be used. I replace 
CS and CS_nature with 1) LSH (the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder) and LSH_nature (dummy variable which equals to 1 if the largest 
shareholder is the government and 0 otherwise) respectively; and 2) STATE_OWN 
(the percentage of state-owned shares).  
The Indep_director, Co_services and BOD_shares are included to test board 
characteristics. Indep_director denotes the percentage of independent directors 
served on the board. According to H2(a), firms with more independent directors are 
less tax aggressive, so I expect to be positive. Co_services is a dummy variable 
which equals to 1 if the board chairman also serves as a firm’s CEO, 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with H2(b), I predict that the duality role of the board chairman will lead 
to more tax aggressiveness and should be negative. BOD_shares measures the 
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board shareholdings which is the percentage of a firm’s shares held by all directors 
of the board. As hypothesized in H2(c), I expect to be negative.  
Following prior literature, I include six control variables that are known to 
influence tax aggressiveness. LEV denotes a firm’s capital structure which is 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. On the one hand, a firm with 
high financial leverage would have lower ETR because of the deductibility of 
interest payments for tax purpose. On the other hand, a firm with high tax burden 
has incentive to use more debt financing. Stickney and McGee (1982) find a 
negative relation between ETR and financial leverage while Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) suggest a positive relation. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total assets. The relation between firm size and tax aggressiveness is also unclear. 
Porcano (1986) and Mills et al. (1998) show that there is a positive correlation. In 
contrast, Stickney and McGee (1982) and Shevlin and Porter (1992) find a negative 
relation. MB is the market value per share divided by net assets per share, and is 
used to measure the firm’s investment opportunities. Spooner (1986) argues that 
ETR may be higher for firms with greater investment opportunities, however, 
Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Chen et al. (2010) find inconsistent results with 
different ETR measurements. ROA, a variable denotes a firm’s profitability, is 
calculated as the pretax income divided by the total asset. It is suggested that more 
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profitable companies would pay higher ETRs (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Wilson, 
2009). CAPINT and INVINT are used to control for assets mix (Stickney & McGee, 
1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997). CAPINT equals to property, plant, and 
equipments (PPE) divided by total assets and INVINT is the year-end total inventory 
divided by total assets. Capital intensive firms are more affected by the differences 
of accounting and tax treatments of depreciation (Chen et al., 2010). Their effects on 
tax aggressiveness are inconclusive. Besides, I also include the industry dummies 
and year dummies to control for potential industry and year fixed effects. The 
definitions of all variables in the regression are shown in Appendix. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
    Table 2 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the regression explanatory 
variables. The average ETR is 22.7% which is marginally lower than the statutory 
tax rate of 25% (33% before the tax reform). The mean percentage of controlling 
shareholdings is less than 50% with the maximum of 75.2% and minimum of 15.6%. 
Of all the controlling shareholders in the sample firms, more than half of the firms 
are state-controlled which suggests the vital role played by the Chinese government 
in controlling listed companies. For the board characteristics, on average, the sample 
firms fulfill the 1/3 independent board members requirement, appoint different 
person to serve as the board chairman and CEO, and only a small portion of shares 
are held by the board members. For the control variables, the average leverage ratio 
(LEV) is 47.5% which is considerable higher than the U.S. firms (20.1% for family 
firms and 24% for non-family firms) in Chen et al. (2010) study. This indicates that 
the sample firms rely on debt financing. The investment opportunities (MB) in China 
are widely dispersed with the lowest of 0.52 and highest of 806.67. 
    Table 2 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of all variables partitioned by 
the nature of controlling shareholders. In general, state-controlled firms have higher 
 37 
 
ETRs and percentage of controlling shareholdings than non-state-controlled firms. It 
is consistent with my hypothesis that government intervention results in less tax 
aggressiveness as reflected by higher ETRs. For the board characteristics variables, 
less board independence and board shareholdings can be observed for 
state-controlled firms. For the firm characteristics, state-controlled firms are more 
leveraged (LEV), in larger size (SIZE), exhibit worse operating performance (ROA), 
and are more capital intensive (CAPINT). 
    Table 2 Panel C presents the correlations among variables. Consistent with my 
hypotheses, CS, Co_services, and BOD_shares are negatively correlated with ETR. 
In addition, CS_nature is negatively correlated with ETR which indicates that the 
state-controlled firms are less tax aggressive. Moreover, the control variables have 
significant relationship with ETR, except for SIZE. Most of the correlations among 
test and control variables are small, thus, multi-collinearity is not an issue. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
ETR 0.227 0.136 0.000 0.198 0.995 
CS 0.405 0.147 0.156 0.394 0.752 
CS_nature 0.583 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Indep_director 0.351 0.048 0.000 0.333 0.667 
Co_services 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BOD_shares 0.028 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.748 
LEV 0.475 0.180 0.000 0.487 0.978 
SIZE 21.443 1.010 17.537 21.349 24.802 
MB 4.039 12.942 0.520 2.643 806.667 
ROA 0.078 0.061 -0.384 0.065 1.651 
CAPINT 0.292 0.186 0.000 0.266 0.960 
INVINT 0.173 0.151 0.000 0.138 0.897 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables Partitioned by Controlling 
Shareholders Nature 
 State-controlled 
firms (N=3,987) 
 Non-state-controlled 
firms (N=2,855) 
  
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Diff. Mean 
ETR  0.237 0.142  0.214 0.125  0.023*** 
CS 0.438 0.147  0.359 0.133  0.079*** 
Indep_director 0.347 0.047  0.358 0.049  -0.011*** 
Co_services 0.093 0.291  0.199 0.399  -0.106*** 
BOD_shares 0.001 0.012  0.066 0.154  -0.065*** 
LEV 0.480 0.178  0.467 0.184  0.013*** 
SIZE 21.620 1.000  21.194 0.971  0.426*** 
MB 3.509 13.462  4.779 12.141  1.710*** 
ROA 0.074 0.053  0.084 0.071  -0.010*** 
CAPINT 0.322 0.193  0.251 0.166  0.573*** 
INVINT 0.164 0.145  0.186 0.158  -0.022*** 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 ETR CS CS_ 
nature 
Indep_ 
director 
Co_ 
services 
BOD_ 
shares 
ETR 1.000      
CS -0.034*** 1.000     
CS_nature 0.084*** 0.265*** 1.000    
Indep_director -0.032*** -0.044*** -0.116*** 1.000   
Co_services -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.151*** 0.058*** 1.000  
BOD_shares -0.124*** -0.086*** -0.303*** 0.098*** 0.138*** 1.000 
LEV 0.147*** -0.049*** 0.034*** 0.019 -0.067*** -0.156*** 
SIZE -0.004 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.010 -0.121*** -0.186*** 
MB -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.048*** 0.011 0.047*** 0.015 
ROA -0.148*** 0.076*** -0.085*** 0.021** 0.048*** 0.144*** 
CAPINT 0.024** 0.086*** 0.189*** -0.082*** -0.053*** -0.126*** 
INVINT 0.123*** -0.012 -0.073*** 0.053*** 0.000 -0.002 
 
 LEV SIZE MB ROA CAPINT INVINT 
LEV 1.000      
SIZE 0.332*** 1.000     
MB 0.092*** -0.070*** 1.000    
ROA -0.242*** 0.051*** 0.096*** 1.000   
CAPINT -0.060*** 0.115*** -0.031** 0.033*** 1.000  
INVINT 0.308*** 0.079*** 0.004 -0.085*** -0.492*** 1.000 
Notes: **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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5.2 Multivariate analysis 
    Table 3 presents the OLS regression results for the model. The industry and 
year dummies are controlled for but not tabulated. The results of the ownership 
structure characteristics, CS and CS_nature, are consistent with H1(a) and H1(b). 
The coefficient of CS is negative and is positive for CS_nature, both of which are 
significant at 1% level. With higher ownership concentration, the controlling 
shareholders maintain sufficient power to execute firm strategies and entrench 
minority shareholders. Thus, tax aggressiveness, which is considered as knowledge 
specific, complex but a direct means to cover rent extraction activities, is more 
likely to be engaged by controlling shareholders. As predicted in H1(b), government 
intervention can reduce companies’ incentives to manage taxes because those firms 
are either under the pressure to pursue political objectives or help to achieve social 
goals. Therefore, state-controlled firms are less tax aggressive. 
   For the board characteristics, the coefficients of Co_services, and BOD_shares 
are all in the expected directions as stated in H2. Consistent with H2(b), the same 
person serves as both the board chairman and CEO can have negative impact on 
ETR. In other words, the duality role of the board chairman results in ineffective 
monitoring of the board and obstructs its oversight and governance role, which in 
turn can lead to firm tax aggressiveness. The significant negative coefficient of 
board shareholdings indicates that the more shares granted to directors will result in 
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larger managerial entrenchment incentives to engage in aggressive tax strategy. The 
result is in line with H2(c).  
However, I find no significant relationship between Indep_director and ETR to 
support H2(a). There are several reasons to explain this finding. Compared with the 
well developed corporate governance mechanism in developed countries such as the 
U.S., China is still at the infant stage and the independent directors may not 
necessarily serve the role to mitigate the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. They are often considered as compliance of the regulation, for 
reputation establishment, and resources generation. Expertise and resources are two 
essential requirements in engaging in aggressive tax strategy. The independent 
directors are seldom tax experts because they are mainly professors in education 
institutions, retirees in subsidiaries, and prior executives in current serving firms 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Their ―part-time‖ mode and inactive participation 
reduce effectiveness of the monitoring role, not to mention bringing tax-specific 
resources. In Chinese listed firms, the independence of the board is weak and the 
independent directors are more decorative than functional (Su, 2010). The result is 
consistent with studies conducted in Chinese context, such as Bai et al. (2004), Gao 
and Ma (2002), and Sun and Zhang (2000), which show that independent directors 
in Chinese listed companies do not influence firm performance. 
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    Regarding control variables, companies with higher leverage (LEV), smaller in 
size (SIZE), lack of investment opportunity (MB), and low profitability (ROA) are 
less tax aggressive and maintain higher ETRs. The positive relation between ETR 
and leverage (LEV) suggests that firms with high marginal tax rates are more willing 
to use debt financing because of the deductibility of interest expenses in calculating 
taxable income. Compared with small and medium size enterprises, large firms can 
hire more tax experts and allocate more resources in tax management. The 
significant positive coefficient for CAPINT is different from the result obtained by 
Gupta and Newberry (1997). Although more depreciation expenses can be deducted 
from an additional PPE acquisition for tax purpose, the higher profits generated as a 
result of using this PPE can to some extent offset the effect of decreasing taxable 
income. Thus, high ETR can still be maintained. The result shows the efficient use 
of the production facility in Chinese listed firms. 
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Table 3. Regression Results 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Explanatory Variables 
Intercept ? 0.4069 9.45 0.000*** 
CS - -0.0320 -2.76 0.006*** 
CS_nature + 0.0110 3.03 0.002*** 
Indep_director + -0.0349 -1.06 0.291 
Co_services - -0.0135 -2.92 0.004*** 
BOD_shares - -0.0644 -3.92 0.000*** 
LEV ? 0.0587 5.85 0.000*** 
SIZE ? -0.0099 -5.44 0.000*** 
MB ? -0.0004 -3.29 0.001*** 
ROA ? -0.2080 -7.49 0.000*** 
CAPINT - 0.0543 5.03 0.000*** 
INVINT + 0.0988 6.79 0.000*** 
R-squared    0.1071 
Adjusted R-squared    0.1035 
N    6842 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
    Table 4 shows the regression results separately for state-controlled firms and 
non-state-controlled firms. The negative relationship between CS and ETR is 
significant in state-controlled firms but insignificant in non-state-controlled firms. In 
contrast, for board characteristic variables except Indep_director, the negative 
coefficient of Co_services and BOD_shares are only significant in 
non-state-controlled firms. The results may suggest the dominant role played by the 
government in influencing tax strategy in state-controlled firms. With more 
concentrated ownership, the state-controlled firms pursue less tax aggressiveness to 
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maintain their reputation and help to achieve other social goals as well as political 
objectives. However, tax strategies in non-state-controlled firms are more influenced 
by the board. The non-state-controlled firms focus more on the duties performed by 
the board of directors. Thus, the duality services and board shareholdings which 
have negative impact on the quality of their services can lead to more aggressive tax 
strategy. The Indep_director is insignificant in both types of firms which may 
indicate its ineffective role played in Chinese listed companies. The control 
variables are also generally consistent with the results for full sample. 
Table 4. Regression Results Partitioned by Controlling Shareholders Nature 
  State-controlled firms  Non-state-controlled 
firms  
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.040 6.78***  0.473 7.47*** 
CS - -0.038 -2.36**  -0.023 -1.38 
Indep_director + -0.042 -0.88  -0.027 -0.6 
Co_services - 0.009 1.20  -0.027 -4.90*** 
BOD_shares - -0.3006 -1.56  -0.066 -4.27*** 
LEV ? 0.058 3.89***  0.055 3.71*** 
SIZE ? -0.009 -3.71***  -0.010 -3.88*** 
MB ? -0.000 -0.93  -0.001 -4.09*** 
ROA ? -0.273 -5.85***  -0.163 -5.01*** 
CAPINT - 0.052 3.49***  0.048 3.08*** 
INVINT + 0.064 2.91***  0.126 6.69*** 
R-squared   0.0763   0.1647 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
  0.0700   0.1567 
N   3987   2855 
Notes: **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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5.3 Sensitivity tests 
    To further examine the consistency of the results, I performed six robustness 
checks. First, I use Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) to replace Pretax 
Income as the denominator to calculate an alternate measure of ETR. The new ETR 
equals to total tax expense divided by EBIT (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). All the 
test variables and control variables are unchanged. The results are shown in Table 5 
and both H1 and H2 are supported. The significant negative coefficient of LEV is 
due to the usage of EBIT in denominator that may dilute the effect of debt financing. 
Table 5. Regression Results of Alternative Measurement of ETR 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Explanatory Variables 
Intercept ? 0.354 11.22 0.000*** 
CS - -0.027 -2.90 0.004*** 
CS_nature + 0.008 2.76 0.006*** 
Indep_director + -0.038 -1.46 0.143 
Co_services - -0.008 -2.14 0.032** 
BOD_shares - -0.047 -3.58 0.000*** 
LEV ? -0.097 -11.70 0.000*** 
SIZE ? -0.002 -1.68 0.094* 
MB ? -0.000 -2.23 0.026** 
ROA ? 0.020 0.97 0.334 
CAPINT - -0.015 -1.69 0.090* 
INVINT + 0.132 11.46 0.000*** 
R-squared    0.1129 
Adjusted R-squared    0.1094 
N    7111 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
(two-tailed tests). 
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    Second, I also replace CS and CS_nature with LSH and LSH_nature 
respectively to proxy for ownership concentration, while all other variables are 
unchanged. The LSH represents the proportion of shares held by the largest 
shareholders and LSH_nature is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the largest 
shareholder is the government, 0 otherwise. The method is used because if the 
company does not disclose its controlling shareholders’ information in financial 
statement, the CSMAR database will automatically treats the largest shareholder as 
the controlling shareholder. The results (not tabulated) for the main test variables 
remain the same as the regression in Table 3. 
    Third, in order to further examine the effect of state ownership, I replace CS 
and CS_nature with State_own (percentage of state-owned shares in terms of total 
share issued). The results (not tabulated) are still unchanged and significant as the 
regression in Table 3.  
    Fourth, some may argue that the decrease in ETRs in year 2008 and 2009 may 
be due to tax reform rather than the influence of ownership structure and board 
characteristics. As the tax reform was effective in 2008, year 2008 and 2009 are 
considered as the transition periods which indicate firms’ responses to changes. In 
order to disentangle the effect of tax reform, I restrict my sample period to 
2003-2007 which is the pre-tax reform period. The results are shown in Table 6. 
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Except for Co_services, all other variables are significant and unchanged as the 
regression in Table 3. 
Table 6. Regression Results of Pre-Tax Reform 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Explanatory Variables 
Intercept ? 0.477 9.02 0.000*** 
CS - -0.031 -2.13 0.033** 
CS_nature + 0.012 2.59 0.010*** 
Indep_director + -0.085 -2.03 0.042** 
Co_services - -0.006 -0.99 0.324 
BOD_shares - -0.060 -2.38 0.018** 
LEV ? 0.065 4.92 0.000*** 
SIZE ? -0.013 -5.49 0.000*** 
MB ? -0.000 -2.60 0.009*** 
ROA ? -0.210 -5.82 0.000*** 
CAPINT - 0.065 4.80 0.000*** 
INVINT + 0.121 6.36 0.000*** 
R-squared    0.0895 
Adjusted R-squared    0.0846 
N    4816 
Notes: **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
    Fifth, the common definition of controlling shareholder in the prior studies is 
the one who holds more than 20% of a firm’s shares rather than the 30% cutoff point 
stated in Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies. As 20% is 
the threshold for preparing consolidated financial statements, therefore, I restrict my 
sample firms to those with CS>20% and all variables remain the same as the 
regression in Table 3. The results are reported in Table 7. The results for ownership 
structure and board characteristics are consistent with my hypotheses with stronger 
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interpretation power. Thus, the definition of controlling shareholders is not a 
concern. 
Table 7. Regression Results of Controlling Shareholdings>20% 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Explanatory Variables 
Intercept ? 0.477 11.25 0.000*** 
CS - -0.041 -3.26 0.001*** 
CS_nature + 0.013 3.49 0.000*** 
Indep_director + -0.034 -0.99 0.322 
Co_services - -0.011 -2.31 0.021** 
BOD_shares - -0.062 -3.65 0.000*** 
LEV ? 0.056 5.14 0.000*** 
SIZE ? -0.010 -5.36 0.000*** 
MB ? -0.000 -2.50 0.013** 
ROA ? -0.221 -7.46 0.000*** 
CAPINT - 0.058 5.22 0.000*** 
INVINT + 0.101 6.75 0.000*** 
R-squared    0.1077 
Adjusted R-squared    0.1038 
N    6458 
Notes: **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
    Sixth, various tax incentives are granted to firms in particular regions or 
industries such as the special economic zones, the open costal economic zones, and 
the high-tech industry. Thus, it may impose noise in the regression results 
interpretation that the lower ETRs are due to tax aggressiveness. In order to control 
for the effect of tax incentives, I include one dummy variable Tax_incentives in the 
regression which equals to 1 if the nominal tax rates reported in the firm’s year-end 
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financial statements are below 33% (for the period of 2003-2007) or 25% (for the 
period of 2008-2009), 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table 8. For 
Tax_incentives, if the company enjoys preferential tax rate, its ETR decreases. All 
the variables significances and signs are unchanged as compared with the regression 
results shown in Table 3. It indicates that the tax incentives will not affect the 
interpretation power of the results.  
Table 8. Regression Results of Tax Incentives 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Explanatory Variables 
Intercept ? 0.503 12.85 0.000*** 
CS - -0.025 -2.31 0.021** 
CS_nature + 0.015 4.28 0.000*** 
Indep_director + -0.048 -1.52 0.128 
Co_services - -0.016 -3.67 0.000*** 
BOD_shares - -0.043 -2.67 0.006*** 
Tax_incentives - -0.089 -28.97 0.000*** 
LEV ? 0.034 3.42 0.001*** 
SIZE ? -0.09 -5.11 0.000*** 
MB ? -0.000 -2.57 0.010*** 
ROA ? -0.244 -9.30 0.000*** 
CAPINT - 0.025 2.40 0.017** 
INVINT + 0.079 5.78 0.000*** 
R-squared    0.2055 
Adjusted R-squared    0.2021 
N    6842 
Notes: **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
This thesis examines the role of corporate governance in tax aggressiveness, 
providing some new insights into how corporate governance affects tax avoidance 
activities. Using data on all A-share non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2009, I find that firms with higher 
percentage of controlling shareholdings tend to be more tax aggressive. Tax 
aggressiveness is reduced if the controlling shareholder is the government. In other 
words, state-controlled firms implement less tax aggressive strategies which may 
suggest that the Chinese government still maintains significant influence on these 
firms. For the board characteristics, the board composition, duality role of the board 
chairman, and board shareholdings are important factors in determining a firm’s tax 
strategy. Companies with higher board equity holdings and duality duties performed 
by the board chairman are more tax aggressive. I do not find significant relationship 
between independent directors and ETRs which suggests the need to improve the 
independence of the independent directors in Chinese listed firms.  
    A major research limitation of this thesis is data constraint. Compared with the 
U.S. companies, listed firms in China tend to have lower financial reporting 
transparency. Thus, a large number of missing data may lower the interpretation 
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power of the regression results as reflected by low R-square. In addition, data 
restriction also limits some alternative measurements of ETRs. Moreover, few 
published paper come to my knowledge directly link corporate governance to tax 
aggressiveness. The limited literature leads to the challenging prediction of some 
governance variables’ directions and the incomparable results. 
    For future research, tax aggressiveness can be tested in a long-run period as 
proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008). In this case, the tradeoff between costs and 
benefits of aggressive tax strategy in the long-term may be different from that in 
short-term. Thus, the firm’s ownership structure and board characteristics may have 
a different impact on tax aggressiveness in a long-term horizon. Second, the 
state-controlled firms can be further decomposed into local-government controlled 
and central-government controlled. Different tax incentives will be provided in these 
two types of firms. Third, other than the board of directors, the supervisory board is 
another independent monitoring mechanism in Chinese listed companies. Except for 
some duties that are similar to the board of directors, such as supervising the 
corporate finance, managements, and protecting the company’s as well as the 
shareholders’ interests, the supervisory board can monitor the legitimacy of directors. 
Thus, the supervisory board has a less direct impact on firm’s performance 
compared to the board of directors. Its impact on tax aggressiveness can be 
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examined either individually or with the board together. 
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Appendix Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
ETR Income tax expense/ Pretax income 
 Income tax expense/Earnings before interests and taxes(EBIT) 
CS Percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholders 
CS_nature Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if controlling shareholder is 
the government, otherwise 0 
LSH Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders 
LSH_nature Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if largest shareholder is the 
government, otherwise 0 
State_own Percentage of shares held by the government 
Indep_director Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Co_services Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the chairman of the board 
is also CEO of the firm, otherwise 0 
BOD_shares Percentage of shares held by the board 
Tax_incentives Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the nominal tax rate is 
below the statutory tax rate (33% for 2003-2007, 25% for 
2008-2009), otherwise 0 
LEV The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets 
SIZE The nature logarithm of year-end total assets 
MB The ratio of year-end market value per share to net assets per 
common share 
ROA The ratio of year-end pretax income to total assets 
CAPINT The ratio of year-end property, plant, and equipments (PPE) to 
total assets 
INVINT The ratio of year-end inventory to total assets 
Industrydummy Dummy variable 
Yeardummy  Dummy variable 
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